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Scarcity of resources for urban infrastructure is a universal concern in 
developing economies. Also, prudent mandate of macroeconomic 
management has led to a reduction in hand-downs from higher 
governments. The sub-national governments have had to look at several 
alternatives with a sense of urgency. In this paper we focus on the 
possibilities of the sub-national governments to access the financial 
markets in general and debt market in particular. Our paper focuses on 
the need to create virtual entities –self help groups amongst ULBs – that 
could expand the domain of eligible ULBs.  We visualize a scheme for 
capital market access by ULBs, which would work without the state acting 
as an intermediary and also without any new institution being set up. We 
provide the theoretical underpinnings, illustrate and operationalise the 
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TOWARDS ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT OF ULBS IN 
MAHARASHTRA 
 




An increasing pressure to make governments at all levels more 
accountable and more sensitive to the demands of the marketplace accompanies 
the move towards decentralization in governance and fiscal decision-making. In 
the face of limited resources there is an urgency to make activities self-
supporting, to curb the provision of free services by refocusing on essentials, and 
rolling back the state from services that the private sector can provide better. A 
crucial issue related to devolution of responsibility and fiscal resources from the 
center to sub-national governments – apart from the enabling legislative changes 
that are called for – is that of increasing the access of sub-national governments 
to financial markets, and the securities markets for investment in infrastructure. 
Raising capital for investment in infrastructure facilities is a universal concern in 
developing and transitioning economies. Also of crucial importance is the need to 
build capacity for proposing bankable projects by the ULBs. The significance of 
these facilities for building competitive economies can hardly be 
overemphasized.  
This paper focuses on the possibility of the sub-national governments 
accessing the financial markets in general and debt market in particular. We 
focus here on the need to create virtual entities –self help groups amongst ULBs 
– that could expand the domain of ULBs eligible to access the credit market. We  
illustrate and operationalise the proposed scheme with the help of data pertaining 
  1to ULBs in Maharashtra. The paper is divided into five sections including the 
introduction. Section 2 gives an overview of the finances of the ULBs in 
Maharashtra, and draws attention to some known sources of revenue generation. 
Section 3 briefly looks at the Indian experience of sub-national borrowing in the 
capital market. Section 4 suggests a methodology and provides illustrations for 
operationalising a new idea that is the main theme of this paper. Finally, in 
section 5 we conclude. 
2. Finances of Urban Local Bodies in Maharashtra: An Overview  
Revenues of ULBs can be broadly classified as revenues from  own 
sources and those from external sources, such as grants from the state and 
loans. Again, own sources of revenues can be categorized as tax revenues and 
non tax revenues. There are specific provisions in the state Acts, regarding 
taxation powers of the ULBs. Article 243X of the Constitution, inserted after the 
74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA) envisages, that states should devolve 
additional taxation powers to ULBs, so as to make them financially competent for 
discharging the added functional responsibilities, mandated by the succeeding 
Article 243W. However, in Maharashtra, there has been no such devolution of 
taxation powers, which would have been expected since it would have been in 
consonance with the process of decentralization. Instead, we have seen that 
taxation powers of small ULBs regarding octroi have been withdrawn by the state 
in March 1999. Hence, the taxation powers of the ULBs are limited to its 
traditional sphere and have not gone beyond various existing provisions in the 
state Acts.  
What is important to note in this context is that  even within the list that 
delimits the taxation powers of ULBs, there are provisions in the state Acts that 
further reduce the flexibility of the ULBs. This has been illustrated in the case of 
property tax. Karnik et. al. (2004) point out the Municipal Corporations in 
Maharashtra can levy property tax as a percentage of annual ratable value of the 
property, and ceilings for such percentages are laid down by the state in three 
different Acts. Bombay Municipal Corporation has no autonomy regarding the 
  2components and rate for each component of the tax, while Nagpur has limited 
autonomy. All other MCs (governed by BPMC Act) have autonomy regarding the 
rate of tax in case of components related to water supply and sewerage only. 
However,  there is no freedom to any MC regarding inclusion of any new 
component or changing the tax base to some other, say, area.  
The important point that we wish to make here is that the power of ULBs 
in Maharashtra appear to be highly restricted with respect to both, the tax and the 
non tax sources of revenues, which constitute their own sources. This has forced 
the ULBs to be dependent on the state for their finances. These constitute 
external sources of finance, which complement the own sources of ULBs. 
However, grants from the state are not devolved by objective or fair principles but 
are ad hoc in nature.  
Thus it would appear that revenue growth of the ULBs has been 
constrained by such inherent structural bottlenecks like, limited autonomy 
regarding taxation, small bandwidth for non tax revenues and  unpredictable 
nature of funds flowing from the state. The problems faced by ULBs have been 
worsened by the fact that the 74th CAA has further added to the list of services to 
be performed by local bodies. As already noted, the functional devolution to the 
ULBs not being matched by supporting financial devolution has lead to too many 
responsibilities chasing a narrow resource base. The problem is further 
aggravated by the stipulation in the Municipal Acts that ULBs must balance their 
budgets. The plethora of contraints on the ULBs has made assessment of their 
functioning difficult: It is difficult to establish whether non-performance represents 
dereliction of duty or inability to perform due to lack of funds. Tabulated below is 
the share of grants and major sources of own revenue in total income of 
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TABLE 1 
INCOME OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND COUNCILS 
 
 












1999-00 55.86 11.14  36.25  15.40 
2000-01 55.17 11.28  34.88  16.19 
2001-02 52.66 10.15  30.08  16.52 
2002-03 49.05  9.06 30.88  13.08 
            
 
The salient points that emerge are the following: 
•  Grants from the state government as a ratio to total income show a 
declining trend. 
•  Of the own sources of income, the share of octroi has been the highest. It 
has registered a gradual decline but still comprises the largest share of 
own income.  
•  The share of taxes on housing and land was 15.4 percent in 1999-00. This 
too shows a declining trend. 
•  Own income as a whole as percent of total income comprised 56 percent 
in 1990-00. This has shown a steady decline and stood at 49 percent in 
2002-03. 
The point that we would like to emphasise is that given the resource 
crunch faced by the government, the ULBs cannot help but depend on 
themselves (singly and collectively) for resource mobilization in the foreseeable 
future if de facto decentralization has to occur. Some much discussed alternative 
sources of revenue that could be explored for improving the finance of ULBs are 
briefly discussed in the sub-section below (see Karnik et. al. 2002 for greater 
details).  
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2.1 Improving the Finances of ULBs: Internal Resource Mobilisation   
Improving overall finances of the ULBs in general would involve   
various steps like: 
¾  Prudent management exercise 
¾  Spending of resources on appropriate items 
¾ Cutting  costs 
¾  Minimizing unproductive expenditure by spending on identified 
priorities, 
¾  The selection of appropriate low cost technologies 
¾  Proper maintenance and timely replacement of exhausted 
infrastructure 
¾  Private sector participation 
¾  Identification of socially essential subsidies and elimination of inessential 
ones. 
ULBs would need to improve on both fronts viz. improve implementation of 
existing sources of revenue and tap new sources. A major source of tax revenue 
for the Municipal Corporations is property tax. The recovery percentage of 
property tax, in its present structure is around 60 to 65 percent, in case of 
Corporations and between 40 to 50 percent, in case of Municipal Councils. 
Hence there is a considerable scope for further improvement. Some less 
explored alternatives would include: 
9  Land can be looked upon as a major resource available (Jha and Siddiqui, 
2000). It can attract good income without any other financial support. 
Development of precious real estate can be a lucrative source of income 
for a local body.  
9  The concept of “Floor Space Index (FSI) Bank” can be also developed. 
The regulations of the ULB could stipulate a certain level of FSI normally 
  5available in a locality and the excess FSI could be purchased at a 
premium from the FSI Bank created by the ULB. Evidently, there would 
have to be a cap on such use of FSI bearing in mind the ability of the city 
to absorb additional construction and provide for city infrastructure.  
9  Transferable Development Rights can also attract handsome revenues to 
the ULB. If the ULB intends to take over a plot of land for public use the 
owner's ability to build on that land is taken away. Traditionally, the land 
owner was compensated through payment of acquisition money, but 
under TDR, it may allow him to use the construction potential on some 
other plot. If the landlord does not own an alternate plot, he can sell the 
TDR, to anyone who wishes to use it. Hence, ULB's finances can be 
bolstered and the TDR concept can prove to be a good tool, not merely for 
land acquisition, but also for getting public works executed. 
9 Other possible sources for revenue generation can be pay and park 
facilities, fees from recreation facilities like gardens, swimming pools etc.  
Tapping some of these potential sources of internal revenue, would 
undoubtedly lead to improvement in the fiscal health of ULBs. It may be worth re-
emphasizing that rationalizing the user charges would help in getting a better 
rating for the ULBs. However, the needs of urban sector are huge and 
accelerating. Greater resources must simply be forthcoming (devolved or raised). 
Improving on existing sources of revenue and looking for newer alternatives such 
as those suggested above are certainly necessary but cannot be sufficient. 
Hence, it is our view that recourse to capital market has become unavoidable. It 
is in this context that we put forth a scheme that would enable the relatively 
weaker ULBs to access the capital market. This is extremely crucial from the 
view point of the inclusive developmental agenda of our country. Before we 
elaborate on our scheme, it would be interesting review the experience thus far 
of sub-national borrowing from capital market.  
 
 
  63. Sub-national Borrowing from Capital Market: Evidence from India 
The existing and widening resource gap has made it almost imperative 
that direct access to capital market be accepted as a viable option of fund raising 
by municipal bodies. However, access to capital market requires financial 
discipline and acceptable credit rating. The appeal of credit ratings is clear: they 
provide a third-party opinion by experts that informs investors without the skill or 
resources to carry out their own investigations, of the relative creditworthiness of 
competing investment opportunities. In India a welcome trend noticeable is that 
an increasing number of municipal bodies are showing an inclination to get a 
credit rating. CRISIL, CARE and ICRA are the three credit rating agencies 
currently functional in India. 
Tapping of the capital market for long-term investment in the infrastructure 
sector is a relatively recent phenomenon in India. Most of the tapping of capital 
markets in India has been restricted to projects that come within the jurisdiction 
of higher-level governments. The use of capital market funds for financing basic 
amenities is still at an early germinal stage. Financial Institutions’ Reform and 
Expansion Programme – Debt component/infrastructure (FIRE-D) is an important 
initiative in this context. Bagchi (2001) has identified factors under the broad 
heads of economic, structural and institutional, which have acted as impediments 
to extensive use of capital market funds.    
One success story of a sub-national government accessing the capital 
market in India is that of Tamil Nadu. In 1996, with the aim of achieving 
managerial efficiency and attracting private capital to urban infrastructure, the 
Municipal Urban Development Fund was converted into an autonomous financial 
intermediary—the Tamil Nadu Urban Development Fund (TNUDF). The new 
entity was established as a trust fund with private equity participation—the first 
public-private partnership in India providing long-term municipal financing for 
infrastructure without state guarantees. Eligible borrowers include urban local 
bodies, statutory boards, public undertakings, and private corporations. Eligible 
sectors include transport, sanitation, water supply, solid waste management, 
  7integrated area development projects, roads and bridges, and sites and services 
(Sood, 2004).  
At the local body level, capital markets have been tapped via municipal 
bonds. Ghodke (2004) documents the history of municipal bonds in India. 
Bangalore Municipal Corporation’s issue of Rs. 125 crores, with state 
government guarantee in 1997 marked the beginning of fully market based 
system of local government finance in India. This was followed by the 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation accessing the capital market without state 
guarantee. Subsequently, municipal corporations of Nashik, Calcutta, Ludhiana, 
Nagpur, Madurai have all issued municipal bonds but not without the support of 
state government guarantees. However, the size of the municipal market leaves 
much to be desired. Ghodke (2004) observes that of the Rs. 407 billion raised in 
the capital market in the country in financial year 2003, ULBs have accounted for 
a mere Rs. 607 crore.   
The experience so far shows that only bigger municipal corporations are in 
a position to take the advantage of the resources available in capital market. 
Medium and smaller municipalities are unable to do so due to weak financial 
position and lack of capacity to prepare viable project proposals. In order to 
enable the smaller municipalities to look for alternative source of funding for their 
bankable projects/schemes, a state level Pooled Finance Development Scheme 
has been set up. The scheme is meant to provide credit enhancement to access 
market borrowings on a creditworthy basis. The main objectives of the 
mechanism being proposed are:  
(i)  Facilitate small and medium size ULBs to access capital market for 
investment in essential municipal infrastructure 
(ii)  Facilitate development of bankable urban infrastructure projects 
(iii)  Facilitate introduction of necessary reforms (e.g. tariff and financial) in 
the ULBs. 
(iv) Facilitate  development  of Municipal Bond market. 
  8Draft Guidelines of the scheme have been approved by the Minister for 
Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation and are at present under 
examination. A tentative allocation of Rs.400 crore under the 10th Annual Year 
Plan has been made for the Scheme. A provision of Rs.80 crore has been 
proposed in the Annual Plan of 2003-04 for the scheme. (see   
http://urbanindia.nic.in/mud-final-site/urbscene/urbanreform.htm  
and http://urbanindia.nic.in/mud-final-site/programs/index.htm). 
Given the context, the focus of the present paper is to try and illustrate an 
idea that in a sense is a modified version or an extension of the Pooled Fund 
Scheme, which would work to the benefit of small and medium sized 
municipalities that have so far been unable to access the capital market. This 
entails working out intra-group contract incentives. The proposed methodology 
has been illustrated for the state of Maharashtra in the section that follows.  
4. Our Scheme: Methodology and Illustrations  
 This state level Pooled Fund scheme being proposed in India is along the 
lines of the “Bond Bank” scheme prevalent in the U.S. In the late 1960s the state 
level bond bank concept emerged in the U.S. to support the borrowing by smaller 
municipalities which otherwise find it difficult to tap the capital market. A bond 
bank is a state sponsored intermediary that borrows from the capital market and 
then lends to small municipalities either by subscribing to their bonds or by direct 
lending. The issuers benefit from lower administrative costs that are spread 
among a large number of borrowers. Pooling of credit also results in a higher 
overall credit rating for the issue as the credit risk is diversified among a broader 
range of municipalities. The bond banks are self-sustaining and charge the 
municipalities a fee for their service. This U.S. version simply dos not go far 
enough since it leads to veritable cherry picking that is not in consonance with 
the developing status of our country nor with the inclusive form of developmental 
agenda that we have mandated for ourselves. 
  The scheme that we would like to suggest would extend the existing 
concept and yet, which would work without the state acting as an intermediary 
  9and also without any new institution being set up. We believe that the existing 
financial institutions can do the job with enabling legal and regulatory provisions. 
Our scheme would provide incentives for not only the best of the ULBs to come 
together and access the capital market, but also demonstrates that strong and 
relatively weak ULBs too could come together an obtain a credit rating as a 
‘Virtual’ Entity. Needless to say that such a coalition would emerge only if it gives 
to each partner at least as much as it would have got if it had independently 
accessed the market, i.e., that the standard imputation conditions apply. The 
scheme proposed here shows that such incentives could indeed be built into the 
system.   
 
4.1 Theoretical Underpinnings 
  In this section we elaborate on the theoretical underpinnings of the our 
idea/scheme scheme that we have been discussing. First we consider the space 
of ULBs which for the universal of discourse for the purposes on hand. This set 
will need to be partitioned in three sub-classes, viz., one that has ULBs that are 
‘good’ then those that are not very good but those that have some redeeming 
features and finally those ULBs that are – in a sense – beyond repairs. In order 
to rank the ULBs there would be a set of criteria that provide the filter for such a 
categorization. Formally therefore we have the following: 
 
9 Let  Ui  (i = 1….N) denote the N urban local bodies. In a specific case 
these may be municipal corporations or A,B,C municipal councils. In this 
general framework we make no such distinction.  
9  We use ‘L’ different criteria, not necessarily of equal importance in order to 
gauge the rating / ranking of ULBs.  
9  We use a two stage filtering strategy to categorise the entire set of ULBs 
into THREE exclusive classes, U(I), U(II) and U(III).  
9  As the first stage filter we use Per Capita Revenue Surplus. All ULBs with 
a revenue surplus gives us the first of these classes viz., U(I) whom we 
shall denote as “CHERRIES”.  
  109  Within the category U(I) we could use some stricter criteria and obtain a 
subset which denote as “SUPER-CHERRIES”. This is simply an 
illustrative mechanism of picking the Best of the Best. This is strictly not 
essential to our argument. 
9  All the ULBs recording a Per Capita Revenue Deficit define a joint set of             
{U(II) ∪ U(III)}.        
9 To distinguish U(II) from U(III) we make use of second stage filtering 
strategy. In our exercise we have identified three criteria for this purpose, 
which we discuss in the next section. 
9  We then define a benchmark for each of these criteria and from {U(II) ∪ 
U(III)} we identify U(II) as being those which pass the test for at least one 
criteria. The U(II) group is then ‘Best amongst the Worst’ and are termed 
as “SALVAGABLES”. 
9  All the revenue deficit ULBs which fail the test for all three criteria are the 
U(III) group and are termed as “DUDS”. The ULBs in this category need 
direct intervention and/or support by the state to strengthen them enough 
so that “they may be able to walk on their own steam”.   
 
Let us now briefly talk about the different financial instruments (Ij) that 
could come into play. One could off-hand mention some such as on lending by a 
FI, muni-bond (specific to ULB or project), general or structured debt obligations 
or pure vanilla or indeed some derivative. Obviously the choice of any one or 
more of the instruments depend on the funding agency, as well as the ULBs that 
come together for the purposes of raising resources and the type of projects that 
are being contemplated. The general theoretical precept here is that the normal 
sequence is from junk bonds to loans to investment grade bonds. Obviously, we 
are not interested in junk bonds that can be issued by the institutions that have a 
poor financial health. Being concerned here with public bodies, such junk bonds 
are not advisable and indeed our argument has been that in such cases 
(especially in the extreme), the state has to intervene in a direct fashion and in a 
decisive way to help such ULBs to get out of the rut that they find themselves in, 
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existence and has been increasing in importance for all categories of ULBs. 
However, the loans do not constitute bank exposure to the extent feasible has 
been argued by us elsewhere (see Pethe and Ghodke 2002). In that paper we 
have underlined the scope and suggested measures towards remedying this 
situation. In this paper however, the focus is on the third category viz., 
investment grade municipal bonds. In the Indian case, the institutional framework 
is already in place for IPOs and this has been successfully exploited in several 
cases. The point is that unless this is extended to general public offering where 
individual investors are incentivised to bid for and hold this paper, we would not 
be able to fully exploit the potential of this avenue. It is also common knowledge 
that one of the necessary conditions for this to happen is the existence of vibrant 
secondary market in this paper.  
The literature on bond issue/market/pricing is common knowledge in 
literature. Obviously, the credit rating of the bond issuer (ULB for us) is a crucial 
input in deciding on the premium. The size of the issue is also important and it is 
pertinent to point out that there are obvious economies of scale to be reaped. 
The significance of this rather obvious observation is that – with some regulatory 
changes – it may be possible for a ULB to go in for an issue size in excess of its 
immediate requirement and use the excess cash profitably for onward lending to 
ULBs or indeed to finance a project – by way of an extension – of another ULB 
and reap technological economies. All this of course is contingent on the 
particularities of the type(s) of projects under consideration.   
Broadly, the set of Universe of projects {Pk} can be loosely sub-divided 
(say) into P(I), P(II), and P(III). Among these P(I) will be comprising of projects 
whose purpose is to supply goods that are in the nature of basic amenities. 
These would normally be made up of goods with overwhelmingly pure public 
good characteristics. The second class P(II) will have projects that deal with 
‘merit’ components and acceptable ‘marketable’ characteristics. Finally, the third 
class P(III) will be ‘almost pure’ market goods that have conventionally been 
produced/provided by ULBs. There is of course another way of looking at the 
  12classification. This has to do with the underlying production technologies and the 
efficiencies to be reaped through scale effects. Also, one can categorize the 
projects depending on whether space (i.e., contiguity for implementation) is a 
consideration. But the latter two categorizations are not immediately relevant. 
Finally, there is an aside that is nevertheless important. The generation of 
identification and proposing of bankable projects is a special skill that requires 
considerable capacity. It is usually the case that such capacity rarely exists with 
‘weaker’ ULBs. Whilst this provides a long term agenda for capacity building 
efforts, in the shorter run, this is one more reason why the different ULBs (Strong 
and weak) need to come together to make a headway. 
The first mentioned classificatory scheme now allows us to make further 
headway. To begin with, let us recall that the current ethos requires ‘everyone’ 
(individually or in a self-help mode) to stand on one’s own feet, as far as 
possible. This, of course presumes that they have the basic wherewithal to do so. 
If not, then it becomes the duty of the state (external agency in general) to push 
the agent/institution to the threshold level. Such considerations then allow us to 
redefine in a focused way the role of the state mandated to fulfill a developmental 
agenda. Thus, {U(III), P(I)}  G 6
N signifies the new role mentioned above. What it 
implies is that instead of spreading the already scarce resources thinly, one 
should clearly demarcate the specific objectives as well as institutions and help 
them in a bigger way so as to make a critical difference in allowing the ULBs to 
cross the threshold mentioned above. As far as P(II) and P(III) type projects are 
concerned, it follows that in case of the former, there is a clear need for 
rationalization of user charges so that at least the operation and maintenance 
(O&M) charges are covered and in the latter case, full cost principle be applied or 
indeed some form of privatization be brought into play. 
To recap what we have, is a partitioned universe of ULBs with each ULB 
being ranked on the basis of certain criteria and then partitioning them into three 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets viz., the CHERRIES, the 
SALVAGEABLES and the DUDS. In the Western model, the FIs will look at only 
the CHERRIES as they alone will have the required ‘rating’ based on the bank-
  13ability of the projects and the credit risk of the institution for the purposes of 
getting loans or issuing debt. Whilst this is the ‘safe’ and ‘prudent’ way, given our 
situation and the developmental agenda, this is clearly not enough. Thus such a 
narrow approach will not do in a developing country like India as the extent of 
‘CHERRIES’ may not be sufficiently dense. Hence, there is a need to extend the 
concept of pooled fund banks so that even some of the ‘relatively good’ laggards 
come into reckoning and we are able to make a dent on the serious problem of 
urban amenities/services. 
We now turn to illustrations with the help of data related to ULBs in 
Maharashtra as to how the extension may be brought about, focusing on the 
‘bond’ or ‘direct lending’ route. We begin by acknowledging that such an exercise 
is slightly ‘futuristic’ in that several preconditions have to be met: 
First, there is the intangible but crucial matter of mind set change so far as all the 
parties are concerned.  
Second, legal/regulatory changes of an enabling nature need to be addressed 
(including granting the status of government paper with concomitant tax 
concessions to the ULB bonds and allowing ULBs to close suitable contract 
amongst each other and with the funding/underwriting agency). 
Third, a thriving secondary market (and not just IPO which already exists) for 
muni-bonds must come into being. 
Our empirical illustration tries to demonstrate the following cases: 
Case 1: U1, U2  ∈ U(I) come together to form a virtual entity V1 such that       
NPV(V1) = α . We then have to argue why such a coalition formation is feasible 
and utility enhancing at the aggregative level as well as at the micro level for all 
concerned (imputation problem). 
Case 2: We illustrate the formation of the virtual entity V2 made up of U1 and U2, 
where U1 ∈ U(I) and U2 ∈ U(II) and consider the same problem as in the earlier 
case. This case is particularly important in that it represents a cross over 
  14possibility, underscoring the development argument for ‘conceptual extension’ 
made earlier in the paper.   
It needs to be argued why such coalitions provide incentives for intra-
contract.  Various arguments have to be made based on scale and portfolio 
principles. There are also reasons based on technology and contiguity and 
arbitrage. It is quite well known – from elementary finance literature – that 
through construction of portfolio the risk associated with the portfolio is pegged at 
a level that is less than the weighted sum of the individual risks of the 
components that go to make up the portfolio. In standard symbols this can be 
formally written as: σ (V1) < w1 σ (U1) + w2 σ (U2). The implication, in our case is 
that the virtual entities will be able to get access to credit/bonds at easier terms 
than individually. Thus when both the ULBs coming together are strong, there is 
still an incentive for them to come together. But more pertinently, even when one 
of them is weak – due to high risk associated – there may be a case for them to 
come together when the composite risk is acceptable for the purposes of credit 
disbursement i.e., σ (V1) < α and α < σ (U2), where α is the acceptable level of 
risk for lending or debt issue. Here of course the imputation problem becomes 
crucial for creating an incentive for the stronger ULB to join the coalition. In both 
the cases mentioned above, all the concerned parties in a Pareto improving way 
may share the resulting ‘spoils’ through bargaining and contract setting. The 
other aspect has to do with the fact that there are overheads involved in the 
process of incurring debt, with the obvious implication that going for large loans 
or bond issue will be rather more cost effective, after all the cost argument of the 
supply function of loans or bonds is, ceterus paribus, monotonically inversely 
related to the quantum involved. These and other scale economies provide an 
important economic rationale for going in for collusion between ULBs. The scale 
economies can also be rationalized from technological angle in fairly obvious 
way. The argument of spatial contiguity will depend on the particularities of the 
specific projects involved. All this of course presumes that there is a possibility 
(enabled by regulatory/legislative) of reaping arbitrage gains. We now turn to 
empirical illustrations. 
  15 Empirical Illustrations: The Bench Marks 
A total of 238 municipalities were considered for the year 2000-01. The 
district of Jalna was left out on account of lack of availability of relevant data. 
Since the exercise is purely illustrative any such data problems will certainly not 
vitiate our results. Also, we chose to keep the city of Mumbai out of the sample 
considered. Results obtained by including and excluding Mumbai city have been 
found to be markedly different (See Karnik et. al. 2002). Inclusion of Mumbai 
would have certainly influenced our illustration as the benchmark norms would 
have been significantly different. 
 
¾  At the first stage we have identified our “CHERRIES” as being those ULBs, 
which show a revenue surplus. 90 such ULBs have been identified. The per 
capita revenue surplus for these show a wide variation and range from a 
minimum of Rs. 0.49 to a maximum of Rs. 13920. These belong to the U(I) 
category. 
¾  A sub-set of this, the “SUPER-CHERRIES” have been picked – in an ad-hoc 
manner – as those, which show a per capita revenue surplus exceeding Rs. 
1000. Seventeen such SUPER-CHERRIES were identified.  
¾  The remaining ULBs i.e. all revenue deficit ULBs (148 in number) belong to 
the joint set of {U(II) ∪ U(III)}. 
¾  The second stage filter is then used to distinguish U(II) from U(III). For this 
three criteria are identified: 
(a) Dependency Ratio (DR): This in a sense is representative of overall fiscal 
balance. We have adapted the measures that have been proposed by the 
Reserve Bank of India (Pattnaik. et. al, 1994) for evaluating the fiscal 
performance of Indian states. This measure gives an indication of the 
dependence of a ULB on resources (such as grants) from a higher level of 
government. This is defined as: 
 
DR = (Total Expenditure – Own Income)/Total Expenditure 
 
  16(b) Administrative Expenditure (ADMIN): Apart from overall performance, a local 
government must be efficient in providing services i.e., public goods, to the 
citizens. The ability to provide such services will be severely compromised if 
expenditure on administration eats up a large part of the resources available to a 
local government. Consequently, we need to devise an indicator that will penalize 
a ULB for spending excessively on ADMIN to the detriment of public goods 
provision. Before giving the formula for ADMIN let us enter a caveat. The level of 
dis-aggregation currently available does not allow one to bifurcate between good 
and bad parts of administrative expenditure, so that we end up overestimating 
the wasteful expenditure. Thus, the proxy indicator, to that extent may suffer from 
lack of sharpness. The indicator that we use is given by: 
 
 
ADMIN = (Expenditure on administration expenditure)/Total Expenditure 
(c) Public Goods provision (PUG): This indicator rewards an ULB for relatively 
higher spending on Public Goods. It is clear that higher spending on public goods 
need not necessarily lead to better service delivery. However, in the absence of 
adequate information on actual service delivery, there is no option but to use 
spending patterns on public goods as a proxy for performance of the primary 
duty by the ULB. Public good as defined in our study is a somewhat broad 
definition including education, sanitation, fire brigade, water supply, roads and 
street lighting 
 
PUG = (Expenditure on public goods)/Total Expenditure   
 
¾ Having settled on these three criteria we need to define a benchmark of 
acceptability for each of them. For illustrative purposes we defined 
benchmark for these criteria as the actual average values for each of these 
criteria in case of the CHERRIES. This benchmark admittedly suffers from the 
obvious limitations of a mean statistic, and hence could perhaps be 
  17appropriately fine-tuned. Specifically, the benchmarks obtained for each of 
these criteria are: 
 
TABLE 2 
BENCHMARK FOR IDENTIFYING U(II) 
(AVERAGE OF 90 CHERRIES) 
DR ADMIN  /TE  PUG/TE 
55 33 28 
 
¾ All the ULBs which passed the test in at least one of these criteria are 
identified as elements of U(II) or the “SALVAGABLES” i.e.   
(a) [DR] < 55 (lower the dependency ratio, better the ULB performance) 
(b) [ADMIN/TE] < 33 (lower the expenditure on administrative services, better the 
ULB performance) 
(c) [PUG/TE] > 28 (Higher the expenditure on public goods, better the ULB) 
 
¾  We identified 19 ULBs that failed in all three criteria i.e. DUDS. These are the 
ULBs that need enhanced and direct state intervention for undertaking P(I) 
type projects thereby operationally redefining the role of the state. 
 
¾  Having obtained our three mutually exclusive classes of the CHERRIES, the 
‘SALVAGEABLES’ and the ‘DUDS’ we then proceed to construction of the 
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Illustration 1 
The virtual entity in this case is such that V1 = U1 ∪ U2 where U1, U2 ∈ U(I) 
TABLE 3 
 






















Thane Navi  Mumbai
 
E   Cherry 422255  1922931 
Thane Thane  E  Cherry 365559  1664740 
  
 Virtual entity = (Navi Mumbai + Thane )  
  
787814  3587671 
NPV has been computed for 50% of the revenue surplus at 7% rate of interest for 
a period of 15 years. 
 
In this illustration Navi Mumbai and Thane are both our “CHERRIES” i.e. 
they are revenue surplus and they also pass the test for all our three criteria. 
Clearly, if they come together and pool in their assets the virtual entity, which is a 
combination of the two will have a superior credit rating and a higher revenue 
surplus and therefore a higher NPV of the loan raised. A coalition of two such 
ULBs is obviously beneficial to both on scale as well as – in this case – on 
contiguity argument. Two points to be noted here, one, that they are now able to 
access together a quantum of funds that are greater than what each one could 
have therefore given that they had the same credit rating, the gain to be made is 
by borrowing large amount resulting in economies of scale from the side of the FI 
(say Bank) or the issue of debt side (arising mainly out of reduction of 
transactions costs. This means that they can go for large technology projects or 
use the left-over resources for further on-lending (should the regulations allow) to 
slightly weaker and smaller ULB and making gains from such a financial trade. 
Two, noting that the two ULBs are contiguous, it may be possible to go for large 
spatial projects than would lead to delivery of service that in a broken form would 
be costlier to provide. 
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Illustration 2 
This illustration is a variant of the first and still considers a coalition of the 
CHERRIES. In this case, however, one of them is a “SUPER-CHERRY” i.e it 
conforms to our stricter norm of having a per capita revenue surplus exceeding 
Rs. 1000. It may be reiterated that there is nothing sacrosanct about this number. 


















type  DR ADM  /TE  PUG/TE
Thane Ambernath  A  Super-
Cherry  76.56 41.12 23.20 
Sangli  Sangli  Miraj  Kupwad  E  Cherry 11.54 15.13 36.90 
 
vitual entity  = (Ambernath + Sangli Miraj Kupwad)  
32.44 23.48 32.50 
The passing norms for ULBs are 
   (a) DR < 55.07 
   (b) ADMIN/TE < 33.22 
   (c ) PUG > 28.03 
 
In this example we find that although both ULBs are CHERRIES, 
Ambernath independently fails to satisfy our benchmark norms for each of these 
criteria despite being a SUPER CHERRY. If it comes together with Sangli Miraj 
Kupwad, passes in all of these criteria, then the coalition of both these ULBs 
passes the test on all three criteria and therefore qualifies for a superior rating 
and a obviously a higher NPV of the loan raised.  Note in this case the two ULBs 
coming together are not spatially contiguous and this will condition the type of 
projects that can be financed through such pooling.   
Both Illustrations 1 and 2 serve to prove the point that the interests of the 
better ULBs would be better served if they were to collude with their counterparts 
and access the debt market as a virtual entity. In a way the two illustrations serve 
  20to operationalise the Pooled Fund Scheme somewhat along the lines of the 
‘western’ model.   
  The modified version that we would like to argue for as being more suited 
to a developing nation like India is that the ‘SALVAGEABLES’ (i.e. those which 
show revenue deficits but pass the test for at least one criteria) and the 
‘CHERRIES’ too could form a coalition. Such a coalition would clearly help the 
weaker ULB, but could also prove to be advantageous for the stronger ULB. 























Thane Ambernath  A  Cherry  76.56 41.12 23.20 68008  309706
Amaravati Amaravati  E  Salvagable 40.83 13.56 36.27 -27897 - 
 
vitual entity  = (Ambernath + Amravati)  
52.34 22.44 32.06 40111  182664
NPV has been computed for 50% of the revenue surplus at 7% rate of interest for a period of 15 
years. 
The passing norms for ULBs are 
   (a) DR < 55.07 
   (b) ADMIN/TE < 33.22 
   (c ) PUG > 28.03 
 
   In this illustration Ambernath is a ‘CHERRY’ with a revenue surplus but 
fails the test on all three criteria. Amravati, on the other hand, is a ‘salvageable’ 
i.e. it runs a revenue deficit but it passes the test for all three criteria. Clearly 
Amravati would want to join hands with Ambernath as on its own it would find it 
inconvenient to access the debt market. Ambernath too would benefit from this 
coalition as the virtual entity of Amberanth and Amravati shows a revenue 
surplus and passes the test on all three criteria. In this illustration, this virtual 
entity of a ‘CHERRY’ and a ‘SALVAGEABLE’ would obtain a superior rating than 
they would have obtained independently.  This is a case that illustrates the 
  21double coincidence of wants being satisfied by the act of the two joining together 
to form a virtual entity. 
 
Illustration 4:  
TABLE 6 
 





















Thane Navi  Mumbai E  Cherry  422255  1922931
Amaravati Amaravati  E Salvagable -27897   
  
 Virtual entity =  (Navi Mumbai + Amravati)  
   394358  1795889
NPV has been computed for 50% of the revenue surplus at 7% rate of 
interest for a period of 15 years. 
 
In this case both ULBs, Navi Mumbai a ‘CHERRY’ and Amravati a 
‘SALVAGEABLE’, pass the test for all three criteria so their virtual entity is bound 
to pass all three criteria. Prima facie in this case one is not able to see the 
motivation for Navi Mumbai to join hands with Amravati. However, there could 
still be some justification in the formation of such a coalition. For instance, should 
the requirement of Navi Mumbai be less than that it can raise from the market. 
Then it could on-lend to Amravati at a rate of interest that is greater than the cost 
of funds to Navi-Mumbai but lower than the rate of the cost of funds that 
Amaravati faces on its own. This would be an explicit financial arrangement 
leading to gains all around. The rationale could also be provided by doing the 
above implicitly, for, such a coalition could be thought of in terms of the project 
being funded that has economies of scale but do not require spatial contiguity for 
reaping benefits of services. For instance, should it be so that the project that 
Navi Mumbai is entering into is such that the ‘output’ leads to a surplus. It would 
then be able to offer Amravati the service with little additional cost, but be able to 
charge a handsome sum for the services provided while remaining within the 
confines of the aforementioned arguments. This serves the development 
  22argument, as Amravati that would have been left out of the debt market now can 
access it indirectly.      
  Illustration 4 is yet another variant of the point – of imputation – that we 
are trying to make that it is not only advantageous for the best of the ULBs to join 
hands together but that there is some merit to even the good and not so good 
ULBs to come together.  
The point that we would like to reiterate and emphasize about this 
exercise is that it only takes us into a realm of possibility within the broad 
framework of existing institutions. Whether, this will actually materialize will 
depend on individual as well as policy initiatives and happy accidents!   
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have drawn attention to the significance of financial 
markets’ access by sub-national governments. We have focused on the Urban 
Local Bodies (ULBs) in Maharashtra. Contextualising the financial status of the 
ULBs, within the parametric environment provided by the current economic 
scenario in India, we have argued that there is an urgent need to address the 
issue of resource crunch vis-à-vis functioning of ULBs and their mandate. Whilst 
there are several well-documented strategies in the literature, in this paper we 
have focused on conceptually extending the concept of ‘pooled fund’ which 
requires the working out of ‘intra-group incentives’. We have also illustrated our 
argument of ‘possibilities’ along with the economic and developmental rationale 
with the help of computations conducted with real data.  
Implicit in the above arguments are several threads. One is that the 
existing infrastructure fund could be used to facilitate underwriting of the projects 
that are being undertaken by coalition of ULBs coming together as virtual entities. 
This should help the ULBs to float debt and with other enabling changes help 
initiate the process of ushering in healthy secondary market for this kind of paper. 
The underlying argument also indicates the required move away by the 
government from taking on the mantle of direct producer or provider of 
infrastructure facilities. The fund should be seen only as seed money to be used 
  23for purposes of creating an environment where the ULBs are incentivised to take 
up project through coalition formation and perhaps capacity building consultancy. 
The other implicit argument here is that the banks should learn (and be allowed) 
to look at the coalitional formation and encourage them by taking ever-increasing 
exposure as a matter of policy mandate or indeed as serving their profit motive. 
These institutions can be useful for creation of policy framework as they do bring 
to the table considerable amount of relevant experience from consortium 
formation from lending side. Yet another important implication – an aside – of this 
paper is the underlying a need to redefine (by delimiting and refocusing) the role 
of the state in this regard. In our scheme of things the state is visualized as a 
facilitator. Legislative changes would need to be explored to provide an enabling 
environment for the scheme to be operational. Also, the ‘DUDS’ would need to 
be identified and their infrastructure needs have to be taken care of directly albeit 
in an accountable way by the state such that it would help them to graduate from 
being DUDS to SALVAGEABLES and then to becoming CHERRIES. Perhaps a 
pre-Infrastructure Fund could be created for this purpose.  
Thus much more important further work that needs to be done in order to 
actualize the potential lies in the domain of the design of feasible policy 
implementation mechanism. Given the situational possibilities, the financial 
institutions and ULBs will each need to be incentivised to come forward and 
create ‘happy accidents’. The government will have to set the stage by 
promulgating enabling policy initiative using the existing Infrastructure fund along 
with provision of a pre-Infrastructure fund – may be with the help of the RBI – that 
will jump-starts the process of economic coalition formation between the ULBs as 
well as help the DUDS along. The good news is that the present economic ethos 
is pushing various institutions – like the financial institutions and ULBs – up a 
steep learning curve. The need to change is no more a question of one’s taste or 
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